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1. Introduction 
 
It would be hard to find a more fundamental concept for the social sciences than 
human nature.  The social sciences are, after all, about human societies, so they had 
better have some idea what the constituents of such societies are like.  But the issue 
central to the present paper is whether human nature is something that the social 
sciences presuppose, an exogenous input from some other part of the intellectual map, 
or whether it is rather the subject matter of the social sciences, something that the 
social sciences aim to illuminate.  Or, and here is where I shall suggest the truth lies, 
perhaps it is not quite either, but human nature is a concept that can only adequately 
be understood from multiple perspectives, some, but not all, of which form parts of 
the social sciences.  The other topic of this paper, causality, is fundamental to 
explaining this last point, as will emerge, I hope, as the paper develops. 
 
The reason that there has been a question about the role of human nature in recent 
years is that there has been an active and influential movement to insist that this was a 
question entirely, or almost entirely, outside the social sciences, somewhere on the 
boundary between biology and psychology.  A natural, if ultimately arbitrary, point to 
date the beginning of this movement is with the publication in 1975 of E. O. Wilson’s 
Sociobiology, and the heated controversy that followed this event.  Wilson famously 
suggested in this work that the extension of evolutionary biology he was advocating 
would lead to the ‘cannabilization’ of the social sciences and ethics, as human 
behaviour, both social and individual, was increasingly understood as an elaborate set 
of fitness-maximising devices. 
 
This reductive vision was rightly subject to severe criticism (Lewontin, Kamin and 
Rose 1984; Kitcher 1985), firstly because of its scientific inadequacy, but also 
because of its unsavoury potential social and political implications.  But for two 
reasons this is hardly the end of the story.  First, as I shall describe in a moment, the 
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same basic ideas emerged soon after in a slightly different guise.  But second, the 
extreme reaction to the sociobiological picture, reductive environmentalism, is no 
improvement.  Indeed the latter may be the position with the more disastrous potential 
implications.  Biological determinism suggests political nihilism, as attempts to alter 
the natural biological state of human life must ultimately be futile.  But environmental 
determinism suggests a plasticity of human nature that may legitimate any political 
system, however repellent it may seem to us, now.  Worker bees, one assumes, do not 
yearn for the freedom to choose their way of life and nor would we if our upbringing 
and social milieu had properly conditioned us to the lives of slaves. 
 
The remainder of this paper will take on three tasks.  The first will be to describe the 
successor project to sociobiology and briefly point out some if its major weaknesses.  
The second will be to sketch a more adequate view of the relation between biology 
and society in the development of human nature.  And finally I shall say something 
more contentious about the way this positive view presents a possible view of human 
freedom.  This will also make clearer the vision of causality that, I believe, makes 
most sense of the problem addressed in the second part. 
 
2.  From Sociobiology to Evolutionary Biology. 
 
As mentioned above, sociobiology slipped out of view during the early 1980s, in part 
in response to some severe criticism.  However, something similar re-emerged in the 
latter half of that decade, rebranded as Evolutionary Psychology
1
.  There is 
considerable debate as to how much this scientific venture differed from its 
predecessor.  The official story is that sociobiology had ignored a crucial link between 
evolution and behaviour, the cognitive mechanisms that had evolved to produce 
appropriate behaviour in response to environmental information (Cosmides and 
Tooby 1987).  It seems unlikely that Wilson had been unaware of the necessity of 
some kind of cognitive mechanism or, to put it differently, of the distinction between 
                                                 
1
 Following Buller 2005, I capitalise Evolutionary Psychology to refer to the specific and influential 
school discussed here, and associated especially with John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, and David Buss.  
Classic statements are Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992 and Buss 1999.  In lower case, I mean by 
evolutionary psychology any attempt to understand how it is that humans came to have (evolved) the 
mental capacities they now exhibit. Provided the latter project does not assume a specific and 
controversial understanding of evolution, it is of course unexceptionable. 
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proximate (neurological) and ultimate (evolutionary) causes
2
.  However, there is no 
doubt that Evolutionary Psychologists devoted more attention to this intervening 
entity, and this led to an aspect of their account of the mind that I want to stress, what 
I refer to as its atavistic character
3
. 
 
Evolved cognitive mechanisms are devices evolved to respond to problems organisms 
face in surviving and reproducing.  But exactly which problems will these be?  
Clearly they will not necessarily be the problems that the organisms are currently 
facing: evolution is not an instantaneous process.  In fact, one of the most distinctive 
features of Evolutionary Psychology was the quite specific answer it gave to this 
question: human cognitive mechanisms evolved in the Pleistocene, the period from 
about 2m years ago, to about 10,000 years ago, the end of the last ice age.  Motivating 
this choice is the thought that substantial periods of time are required for significant 
evolutionary change, and the Pleistocene is conceived of as a sufficiently extended 
period with reasonably constant conditions to which human life could adapt.  It is also 
the most recent such period, and therefore an appropriate era during which to look for 
characteristics that distinguish humans from other lineages from which they have 
diverged, most recently the great apes.  Much of evolutionary psychology has 
consisted of reflection on the conditions that might have obtained during this period, 
and on the behaviours that would have been most favoured by natural selection given 
those conditions.  This has been more or less supplemented by empirical 
investigations aiming to show that the appropriate behaviours have, indeed, evolved. 
 
There are, unfortunately, many problems with this line of thought.  To begin with, 
knowledge of the conditions in the Pleistocene is a lot less certain than one might 
wish and, more importantly, those conditions were probably far from stable.  It has 
been argued that the safest inference from the Evolutionary Psychologists’ 
assumptions would be that human psychology should be enormously flexible to take 
account of this variability.  But even if we did know as much as we cold wish about 
the Pleistocene, including that the relevant conditions there were highly stable, the 
procedure in question would be highly dubious.  First of all, a lot of human behaviour 
                                                 
2
 This distinction was made famous by Ernst Mayr (1961). 
3
 I shall concentrate my criticism of Evolutionary Psychology on this point.  This is far from exhausting 
the difficulties the position faces.  For more comprehensive criticism see Dupré 2001, Buller 2005.  I 
explain the present objection in more detail in Dupré 2008. 
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has roots that are far more ancient, and that are shared with many of our not even very 
close relatives.  Sociability, for instance, is not a uniquely human attribute, though its 
detailed implications may be different in humans than in other animals.  But then, 
second, the assumption that significant evolutionary change must have taken at least 
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of years, is also questionable.  This latter 
assumption is based on a model of evolution as change in gene frequency resulting 
from selection of advantageous alleles.  But significant changes in the nature of 
human sociality are evident over historical periods of tens or hundreds of years, 
presumably because they are due to cultural, or possibly epigenetic, processes.  Why 
should similar processes not also facilitate the evolutionary divergence between 
humans and non-human relatives?
4
 
 
I mentioned that Evolutionary Psychologists attempt with varying degrees of 
commitment to provide empirical backing for the hypotheses derived from reflections 
on the Pleistocene.  It should be stressed that empirical support is being sought for 
universal claims about human psychology. There is some room for explanation of 
diversity in human behaviour through appeal to different environments in which 
people grow up, and specific differences in the experiences of individuals.  But the 
object of interest is what is common to all humans: human nature.  There are, 
certainly, worthy motivations for a concern with universal human nature, for example 
it may serve as a ground for rejecting racist views that claim deep differences between 
groups of humans.  On the other hand, evolutionary psychologists do make a lot of the 
differences between the sexes; from an evolutionary perspective it is certainly a 
highly salient one.  The historical message seems to be that with sufficient ingenuity 
views about human nature can be deployed on either side of most political issues
5
. 
However, the Evolutionary Psychologists’ treatment of sexual difference does point to 
deep theoretical difficulties with their general position. 
 
                                                 
4
 Limitations to the neo-Darwinist view of evolution assumed by Evolutionary Psychology are 
discussed in Dupré 2010. 
5
 The political versatility of scientific findings is illustrated in some detail in the second half of Barnes 
and Dupré 2008 with respect to genetics and genomics.  What we describe there as ‘astrological 
genetics’ the vulgar view that sees details of human behaviour ineluctably inscribed in genes, would be 
difficult to deploy in a politically progressive way.  There is probably no reputable scientist who 
believes the extreme vulgar view, though it is easily read into a lot of popular writing, not least by 
Evolutionary Psychologists, and it is often implicit in casual statements by scientists extolling the 
importance of their fields.   
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The notion that there is no difference at all between the human sexes except what 
local conventions of gender dictate has largely been abandoned, and this is probably a 
good thing.  It is an unhelpful view because it represents exactly the veering to 
reductive environmentalism that I mentioned above.  There are, of course, biological 
differences between men and women.  The trouble is that although Evolutionary 
Psychologists claim that their theories are interactive—the psychological modules we 
all share determine behaviour in ways responsive to and hence appropriate for 
environmental circumstances—their evolutionary arguments are presented in terms of 
universally optimal behaviour for humans, for males or for females.  Moreover, the 
dispositions that humans develop through their lives are universal.  If humans 
universally have a tendency to reciprocate cooperative behaviour, let us say, and to 
punish selfish behaviour, the interaction is only at the point of detecting an instance of 
cooperation or selfishness and then behaving appropriately.  Development, the 
process of becoming a mature human with a particular set of responses to 
contingencies in the world, turns out to be irrelevant.  A proper interactionism, on the 
other hand, does not merely involve appropriate interaction with various 
environmental contingencies, something that probably characterises every life form 
on the planet, but rather refers to development that produces different mature 
phenotypes in response to different environments.  This much is also true of many 
organisms, perhaps most strikingly plants.  What is developed to a unique degree in 
humans is the ability to develop a cognitive phenotype, a set of cognitive 
mechanisms, if you like, that is adjusted to the environment in which it matures.  And 
this is something that the evolved cognitive mechanisms of the Evolutionary 
Psychologists are wholly unable to comprehend. So I now turn to a view of evolution 
that is better fitted to this task. 
 
3.  From Evolutionary Psychology to Developmental Systems Theory 
 
Evolutionary Psychology, as I have tried to explain, is ultimately committed to a view 
of development that sees the basic parameters of cognitive systems as somehow 
inscribed in our DNA.  One reason that it does this, to which I have already alluded, is 
that it is still very much mired in the assumption central to neo-Darwinist thinking, 
that the products of the evolutionary process could only be preserved in the long term 
if they were entrusted to the care of the genome, to Dawkins’s ‘immortal coils’ 
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(1976).  This assumption has little to be said for it, however.  Genes are by no means 
the only vehicles by which information about development can be passed down from 
one generation to the next, and it is far from clear what degree of stability—
immortality—is required for such a mechanism of heredity to function in an 
evolutionary process. Three generally interconnected processes that have come under 
recent investigation and that illustrate the limitations of traditional gene-centred neo-
Darwinism are epigenetic inheritance, transgenerational niche construction, and 
cultural evolution.  I shall next say a little about each of these.   
 
3.1 Epigenetics 
 
Epigenetics embodies a fundamental reevaluation of the ways that genes work.  
Genomes are constantly undergoing chemical modifications through interactions with 
the cellular environment.  Most well-known of these is methylation, the alteration of 
cytosine, one of the bases that make up the famous genetic code, by the addition of a 
methyl (CH3) group.  Other epigenetic processes modify the protein core that forms 
part of the structure of the chromosome. Methylation generally reduces the probability 
that the sequence of DNA in which it occurs will be transcribed, thus changing the 
overall output of RNA transcripts from the genome.  Processes of this kind help to 
explain the different behaviour of genetically identical cells in the different parts of 
the bodies of multicellular organisms.  The crucial implication of the expanding 
understanding of epigenetic phenomena is that it finally lays to rest the idea that the 
nature and behaviour of an organism was somehow inscribed in the sequence of 
nucleotides in its nuclear DNA.  It is now clear that this sequence provides no more 
than a (vast) set of chemical possibilities; what is actually done even in terms of the 
transcription of RNA molecules, depends on a further level of chemical modification, 
and one that is far more transitory than DNA sequence. 
 
Contrary to an earlier belief that at least only DNA sequence was passed on to 
subsequent generations, it is increasingly clear that some epigenetic changes can be 
inherited too.  Striking illustrations of this kind have emerged from the UK Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC), a project involving 14 000 
mothers enrolled during pregnancies in 1991 and 1992.  The findings of this project 
have included a correlation between smoking by men prior to puberty and obesity in 
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their male offspring, and—bizarrely—an inverse correlation between the availability 
of food for men in childhood, and the longevity of their grandsons (but not 
granddaughters) (Pembrey et al. 2005) .  Although it is difficult to assemble 
conclusive evidence, such results add to the plausibility of the long held suspicion that 
descendants of victims of the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944-5 showed symptoms such 
as low birth weight, and that these were the consequence of epigenetic inheritance. 
It is also important that epigenetic inheritance need not involve the direct transfer of 
molecules between generations.  A fascinating illustration of this point can be found 
in the research on maternal behaviour in rats by Michael Meaney and colleagues 
(Champagne and Meaney 2006).  It appears that attentive mothering by rats, involving 
a lot of licking of rat pups, produces calmer, less nervous adult rats, and that this is a 
consequence of epigenetic effects in the developing rat brains initiated by maternal 
care. These calmer adults, if female, are likely to lick their pups more.  Hence the 
epigenetic changes to the rat’s brain can be passed on by means of a process involving 
behaviour alterations between parent and child.   
Another important point about this example is that it illustrates the fact that 
environmental influences on the organism can produce epigenetic changes, another 
crucial idea in developing a picture of development that goes beyond simplistic 
genetic determinism.  A disturbing example of this point is provided by the growing 
evidence that assisted reproductive technologies, by providing an abnormal 
developmental environment at a crucial point in embryonic development, can have 
epigenetic effects that may produce disease.  These certainly include rare disorders 
known to be epigenetic, and it is increasingly suspected that these technologies 
substantially increase the risks of diabetes and obesity in later life (Pembrey 2010).  
More speculative is the thought that the realisation that the environment can affect the 
behaviour of genes and can do so in ways that may be heritable, raises the spectre of 
Lamarckian processes in evolution.  This is an issue I shall not pursue here however 
(but see Jablonka and Lamb 1995). 
3.2. Niche Construction 
It is still often supposed that there exist niches in nature, and organisms evolve to 
occupy them.  On the other hand it has been known, at least since Charles Darwin’s 
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extensive and classic investigations of earthworms (Darwin 1881), that organisms 
can have a profound influence on their environments, and can do so in ways that are 
beneficial or essential for their ways of living.  Of particular importance is the fact 
that the niche that the organisms construct is the environment in which subsequent 
generations develop.  Thus, as opposed to the niche being a pre-existing space to 
which natural selection adapts a group of organisms, the organisms come to be 
adapted to the environment that its members have constructed, in part because that 
environment provides some of the conditions that enable them to develop in an 
appropriately adapted way.  I shall therefore sometimes refer to the constructed niche  
as a developmental niche.  Classic examples of niches both constructed and 
developed are provided by the beaver, the entire life of which focuses on the 
resources provided by the dam that it itself constructs, and the termite, whose mounds 
are remarkable achievements in climate control and much else.  But these are only 
extreme examples.  It is increasingly acknowledged that niches are not pre-existing 
givens, but rather co-evolve with the organisms that inhabit them (Odling-Smee, 
Laland and Feldman, 2003).  And surely the organism that has taken this 
phenomenon to the highest level is Homo sapiens. 
From certain perspectives one may admire the climate regulation system of a termite 
mound more than the energy-guzzling air conditioning systems that keep the 
inhabitants of Los Angeles or Hong Kong comfortable on hot days, but it would be 
hard to deny that the latter constitute even more complex systems, and ones that 
would not have been possible without the unique cognitive endowments of the 
human species.  More fundamental to human development, on the other hand, are the 
hospitals in which most of us are now born, and which contribute to the extensions of 
our life spans, and the schools that provide us, over many years, with the skills 
necessary to negotiate successfully the enormously complex material and social 
environments we construct.  No one could be tempted to imagine that a human infant 
raised in the wild by non-humans would acquire these skills by sheer force of 
genome. 
One way of thinking about these phenomena is through Richard Dawkins’s (1982) 
notion of the extended phenotype.  On Dawkins’s view, a termite’s genes don’t just 
build termite bodies, they build termite mounds by determining the behaviour of 
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termites that results in the building and maintenance of mounds.  It should be noted 
that this provides a very different causal path between the generations from the 
familiar idea of a genome directing the development of an organism.  For one thing, 
it is evidently impossible for a termite to build a mound by itself, so that the termite 
genome is at best only part of a much larger system that in its entirety provides the 
conditions for the production of new termites.  My own view is that the differences 
are greater than the similarities, and Dawkins’s way of describing things is likely to 
mislead more than it enlightens.  But I don’t need to pursue that argument here, since 
the focus will remain on the human case.  And no one could suppose that the 
environment that humans create for, among other things, the production of new 
humans, is simply a consequence of genetically determined human behaviour.  The 
point is probably too obvious to require argument.  It is sufficiently established, for 
example, by the diversity of human environments.  Of greatest interest here, and one 
of the central explanations for that diversity, for the particular ways in which 
particular groups of humans shape their environments, is cultural evolution.  To this I 
now turn. 
3.3 Cultural Evolution 
That culture can generate processes similar to biological evolution has been a 
familiar idea for a long time.  Recent discussions generally date from the sometimes 
rather technical analyses of Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1981) and Boyd and 
Richerson (1985).  The basic idea is that elements of culture are transmitted from one 
human to another, and if the cultural item is beneficial to its possessors it will tend to 
be passed on more often and become more common.  This deliberately vague 
summary covers many possibilities.  Transmission may be from parents to offspring, 
but it certainly need not be: transmission from teachers to students or between peers 
is perhaps equally or more common.  ‘Beneficial’ could be interpreted in a way 
analogous to biological evolution as promoting survival and reproduction, but it also 
need not be.  It might just mean something the possessor enjoys, or it may be 
pleasurable or otherwise advantageous to transmit it.  Cocaine use probably doesn’t 
increase reproductive success, but the habit appears to be easily picked up, and the 
economic context of many contemporary societies tends to generate a subset of users 
with a strong interest in finding new recruits to the practice.  The sources cited above 
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offer a range of different plausible and even empirically supported dynamics for the 
evolution of various cultural items.   
Another approach that has received a good deal of attention starts rather from the 
perspective of the cultural element itself.  I refer to so-called memetics 
(Blackmore1999, following Dawkins 1976).  Here the idea is that there are certain 
cultural items, ‘memes’, that are very good at getting themselves transmitted from 
one human mind to another, and human minds thus end up being colonised by the 
most successful such memes.  Although this perspective can provide some 
illumination in particular cases, as a general approach to cultural evolution it is 
highly simplistic, and not surprisingly it shares many of the defects of simplistic 
gene-centred approaches to biological evolution.  For example, it has become 
increasingly clear that the division of genomes into a specific number of distinct 
genes is a human imposition rather than a reflection of the nature of things (Barnes 
and Dupré 2008).  That culture does not exist as an objectively determined set of 
discrete elements is far more obvious. 
The last remark points to some very serious issues that I have glossed over.  My talk 
of cultural elements or items above is no more justified than the assumption that 
culture can be divided into memes.  Indeed, and worse, I have written as if it was 
unproblematic what the word ‘culture’ refers to, and certainly this is not the case.  
Fortunately, I do not think it is necessary to go into any of these difficult questions 
here.  All I want to insist on now is that a wide range of behaviour transmitted 
between human individuals, including from more mature to juvenile individuals, is 
part of the set of resources involved in the successful development of human 
individuals.  I have wanted to indicate that there are interesting questions to be asked 
about the processes by which this behavioural repertoire changes over time, though I 
certainly do not want to commit myself to the view that this is best studied in terms 
of formal models, or indeed that all such phenomena are amenable to such study at 
all.  Given only this very general assertion, it is possible to see how far the human 
developmental system differs from that implicitly assumed by evolutionary models 
limited to an obsessive focus on the genetic. 
3.4 Developmental Systems 
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The point I have been making is in many ways an obvious one: the successful 
development of a human takes the confluence of a considerable variety of resources.  
These include a great deal that is provided by other humans, some through direct 
interaction, many more through the construction of the environment in which 
contemporary human life is possible.  There are also, of course, many biological 
conditions.  Although one may say that first among those is a zygote with an 
appropriate and not fatally corrupted genome there is much more.  The zygote and 
the developing embryo and fetus undergo a series of interactions with the 
environment provided by the mother’s body, and the influence of this environment is 
to some extent affected by the wider environment in which the mother herself is 
placed.  All of this makes nonsense of the idea that somehow the future adult human 
is inscribed in the zygotic genome, if only we had the ability to read it.  Although few 
contemporary theorists assert so crassly the preformation of the adult in the genome, 
many implicitly or explicitly assume more of this picture than is defensible.   
The appreciation that evolution can act on many different aspects of the 
developmental system is another way of seeing the inadequacy of Evolutionary 
Psychology.  Most obviously this is illustrated by cultural evolution—the clue, after 
all, is in the name.  Cultural evolution has surely had a great deal to do with the very 
different phenotypes (behavioural, at any rate) exhibited by contemporary humans 
and their ancestors a few centuries ago, and indeed between those exhibited in (say) 
New York City, rural England, and the forests of New Guinea.  Genetically-minded 
evolutionists are inclined to respond that cultural differences are easily mutable, and 
hence superficial.  And it is true that an infant born in rural England or even New 
Guinea and transplanted to New York City might grow up as a typical New Yorker.  
But even assuming this is true, it of course begs the question by assuming that all that 
really matters is the ‘deep’ biology.  This, and the argument that deep biology 
(genetics) takes a very long time to change significantly (a premise increasingly 
questionable in the light of epigenetics), are what underlie the argument for 
Evolutionary Psychology that I have been particularly concerned to refute. 
One way to see the power of cultural evolution, on the other hand, is to stress its role 
in the reconstruction of the human niche.  Let us focus on a very small episode of 
cultural evolution, say that which has occurred in Europe over the last two centuries.  
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Human behaviour is, I suppose, significantly different between the ends of this 
period.  At the beginning of the period a much higher proportion of people were 
occupied with agricultural work of some kind, and the kind of agricultural work was 
mainly different from anything available today.  The affluent travelled in horse-
drawn vehicles, the rest on foot; most people stayed much closer to home than they 
do today.  No one watched television or played video games.  Generally people did 
different kinds of work and entertained themselves in different ways.   
The biologically inclined will tend to acknowledge these differences, but stress that 
both then and now people had sex, raised children, competed with one another for 
status, and so on; in these fundamental ways nothing changed.  But as these activities 
do not even distinguish us from apes, or indeed most other animals, it is clear that a 
rather finer grain of description is relevant.  No doubt there are finer grains of 
description than these that will count the populations in question as similar. One of 
the deeper problems in this area is between any two groups of organisms there will be 
similarities and differences.  As a population evolves new differences will appear and 
old similarities will disappear. What constitutes significant, interesting differences 
that should be marked by the term “evolutionary change”?  I do not see how any 
answer to this could be given by Nature; it is up to us how we use this term.  We 
might decide by fiat to apply it only to genetic changes, but if we did we should be 
careful not to infer anything from this about the importance of different kinds of 
change in nature.  My point is just that in terms of changes that are of interest to us, 
very considerable differences occur to humans in relatively short periods of time, and 
whether or not these involve genetic differences may be an interesting question in its 
own right, but has little bearing on how significant the changes may be. 
But to return to the main thread, I wished to emphasise particularly the ability of 
cultural evolution to transform the developmental niche.  And here, at least in 
contemporary developed countries, it seems clear that humans have learned in quite 
recent time, to construct a remarkably novel environment for the development of 
their young. Our homes are heated, plumbed with incoming water and outgoing 
waste, and provided with electricity.  Entertainment arrives through the air or in 
subterranean cables at specially made receivers that project images of musicians, 
actors, etc. Our food comes from supermarkets, sometimes in cans or ready-frozen 
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meals.  If our health is threatened we are moved to special facilities where specialists 
intervene to restore our proper functioning.  Massive infrastructures facilitate our 
movement through space and our communications with one another independent of 
physical proximity.  And most importantly of all in the present context, other 
locations house specialists who impart to the young some of the vast body of 
information necessary to thrive in these very complex environments.  All of this is 
entirely banal. What is curiously often overlooked, however, is that these prodigious 
changes to the human environment, concretisations of our rapidly evolving culture, 
profoundly affect the developmental resources available to growing humans.  For that 
reason their introduction should be seen as representing major evolutionary change. 
One simple example may further illustrate the point.  The mobile phone did not exist 
when I was a child.  In fact it is for hardly more than a decade that it has been 
omnipresent, a mandatory accoutrement for everyday life in developed countries.  
And whereas it may seem only more or less mandatory for people of my generation, 
for those aged, say 10-20, it is as unthinkable to be deprived of one’s phone as to 
wander the streets stark naked.  Most teenagers move through the world, by virtue of 
this technology, in a continuous dialogue with a group of friends who need not be in 
any physical proximity.  In fact the virtual community seems far more salient than the 
contingency of physical proximity, very probably the cause of considerable conflict 
in spaces such as train carriages, in which an older generation continues to see 
physical proximity as a decisive basis for at least polite interaction.  It is not, 
therefore, merely behaviour that has changed for those who have grown up with the 
mobile phone, but the entire experience of social space, transformed from a direct 
function of physical space, to a virtual space within the voluntary control of the 
individual.  Needless to say, the rate of such evolutionary change is entirely different 
from the genetic change so beloved of neo-Darwinists. 
4. Human Nature 
It is now possible to see why I want to deny that there is any such thing as human 
nature, when this is understood as something constant through the history of the 
species and across members of the species.  By human nature, therefore, I shall in 
what follows mean only the nature of a particular human, or the nature typical of, or 
average for, a particular group of humans. Human nature as a population average can 
 14 
evolve rapidly over time; and individual human nature can vary considerably within a 
population at a time.  The reason for this is not, as Evolutionary Psychologists 
imagine to be asserted by the ‘Standard Social Sciences Model’ (Barkow, Cosmides 
and Tooby 1992), that human nature is something superficial and trivial that can be 
written on the blank slate of the human mind by any ambient culture.  On the 
contrary, it is a consequence of the complexity of the way human nature develops, 
the multiple causal factors involved in the progression from zygote to mature human 
with a relatively settled set of behavioural dispositions
6
.  The complexity of the 
process and the number of factors that influence it explain both these dimensions of 
diversity.  Evolution can change the characteristic, or typical behaviour of a 
population through the accumulation of (at least) genetic, epigenetic, and cultural 
changes.  It is safe to say that in recent human history the last mentioned has been the 
leading driver, as cultural evolution has drastically altered the species-typical 
developmental niche.  It may well be that some of these changes have become more 
firmly entrenched through parallel epigenetic or even genetic changes. 
It is equally clear that recognition of the variety of factors involved in development 
makes possible a diversity of individual outcomes within even quite narrowly defined 
populations.  Everyone recognises that there is genetic diversity within most 
populations and specifically among humans.  A great and currently increasing 
quantity of work goes into correlating these genetic differences with phenotypic 
differences.  A major form of contemporary biomedical research is the genome wide 
association study (GWAS), which uses the very large volume of genomic data we 
now have about human populations to find correlations with medical outcomes—
physiological and psychological disease.  I don’t mean to raise an objection to such 
studies, which may well succeed in usefully identifying causal factors involved in 
pathological processes.  However, as everyone involved in such research is aware, 
this is a hardly a search for sufficient causes.  GWAS will at best provide clues to the 
detailed causal processes involved in pathology. 
A good indication of the difficulty can be gained by reflecting briefly on by far the 
strongest known correlation between a genomic factor and a psychological pathology, 
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 I say relatively settled.  In fact human development should be seen as a process that continues from 
fertilisation of the egg until death.  It is probably safe to say, however, that dispositions are a good deal 
more fixed in the last few decades of this process than in the first. 
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a correlation far too well known to require anyone to launch a GWAS, namely the 
genetic cause of violence.  The cause in question is, of course, the Y chromosome.  
Possession of this genomic feature increases the probability that a person will commit 
a violent crime by a factor of 5 to 10, the sort of finding which would be likely to 
achieve considerable publicity if it related to schizophrenia or cancer, say. The 
example can usefully highlight a number of quite general, mainly fairly obvious, 
points. 
To begin with the most obvious point, a genetic cause is not generally a sufficient 
cause.  Most men do not commit violent crimes.  And it is not a necessary cause.  10 
to 20% of violent crimes are committed by women.  Like any other human trait, the 
disposition to violence develops in interaction with a range of other factors, for 
example those explored by social scientists interested in the causes of violence.  The 
variation in these factors, presumably, explains the wide differences in the prevalence 
of the trait in different social contexts
7
.  But saying all that is not to deny that the 
genetic difference plays a role.  This might mean that in all actual and most 
imaginable social contexts there would be a predominance of male over female 
violence. It is easy enough to imagine differences in hormone levels, the autonomic 
nervous system, or even more specific cognitive biases, that could result in such an 
enhanced disposition.  And these differences may even be explained, in part, by the 
evolutionary scenarios offered by Evolutionary Psychologists. 
But the point I want to emphasise most strongly with this example is that even with 
such a robust phenomenon and a well-grounded belief in causal relevance, the 
usefulness of this genetic information is very limited.  No one serio usly advocates 
addressing the social problem of violence by universal incarceration, elimination, or 
selective abortion of fetuses with Y chromosomes.  This is a relevant factor in that 
causes of male and female violence may well be significantly different, and because it 
alerts us to the greater importance of focusing on the causes of male, rather than 
female, violence.  But any practical impact on the social problem will require 
understanding in real depth and detail the processes that lead some people with Y 
chromosomes (and a smaller number without) to end up as adult humans with an 
atypical tendency to resort to violence. 
                                                 
7
 For an analysis of some factors affecting the prevalence of domestic violence, for example, see 
Archer (2006). 
 16 
One final point should be added with respect to the causally complex situation just 
described.  There is a widespread if inchoate intuition that there is something specially 
deep and important about genetic causes.  One thing that may contribute to this is a 
sense of their immutability: apart from some very recent and still quite unreliable 
technologies, there is nothing much we can do about genetic causes.  But for the 
multicausal situations I have been considering, this is a reason for inferring the lesser 
importance of these causes.  A long tradition of philosophical analysis has considered 
the question how we pragmatically distinguish a particular factor as “the cause” from 
a complex causal nexus (Mackie 1974).  A central conclusion is that we distinguish a 
fixed background (standing conditions) from the distinguishing and not necessarily 
expected factor.  Thus, in one classic example, an electrical short circuit rather than 
the presence of oxygen is offered as the cause (and, more obviously, the explanation) 
of a fire in the hay barn.  The short circuit is the “difference-maker”; the oxygen is 
present just as it is in countless other non-burning barns
8
.   
The preceding idea alerts us to the importance of being very clear about the scope of 
the questions we are considering.  If we are interested in the general phenomenon, 
why men are more disposed than women to violence across a whole range of social 
contexts, then it may be that some physiological upshot of the Y chromosome is what 
makes the difference.  But for most explorations of violent human behaviour being 
male is a background condition, and we are interested in causes that make the 
difference between violent and non-violent men.  Similarly when we are interested in 
cross-cultural differences we will look at the differences between cultures, and the 
distribution of XX and XY karyotypes will be a background condition. As with 
almost any variable human trait, there are likely to be other genetic differences that 
affect the trait to some degree.  Experience so far, however, suggests that it is most 
unlikely that there will be anything with an effect comparable in size to that of the Y 
chromosome. 
Human Autonomy 
                                                 
8
 A sophisticated development of a similar idea, but based on the idea of the potential manipulability of 
a cause, has been developed by James Woodward (2003).  However, for present purposes the simple 
idea outlined in the text will be sufficient. 
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I have said a good bit about the genetic determinism which is still such a regrettable 
concomitant of much thinking about genetics.  I want to finish on a rather different 
topic, determinism in general and the worries that this has long engendered about 
human autonomy.  Space will not permit a detailed defence of my rejection of the still 
widely endorsed deterministic perspective
9
. What I would like to argue is that, 
contrary to a common philosophical assumption, rejection of the deterministic 
worldview does in fact have significant consequences for our view of what it is to be 
human. 
Outside the philosophy of science it is still widely assumed that a commitment to 
determinism is an inescapable concomitant of taking scientific knowledge seriously at 
all.  However, it is a quite different story among philosophers who have attempted to 
engage seriously with the contents of scientific belief.  Philosophers of physics have, 
of course, given up on classical ideas about determinism since the general acceptance 
of quantum theory, though it is still often supposed that determinism can somehow 
reappear unharmed at the macroscopic level.  To this I comment only that such 
containment of indeterminism seems incredible.  Schrodinger’s cat may or may not be 
around to kill the mouse that would have moved the nail that stuck in the shoe of the 
horse that would have…The fact that there are deterministic processes that emerge at 
the macroscopic level cannot exclude the amplified effects of microscopic events that 
are not deterministic from interfering with the orderliness of the macroscopic sphere. 
Philosophers of biology are perhaps not typically much exercised by this question 
since, on the whole, they have now given up on the reductionism that, it was once 
imagined, might import determinism from the microscopic sphere.  On the face of it 
the regularities that biologists discern or the models that they construct look anything 
but deterministic. Biologists, it is true, do tend to assert their commitment to 
determinism and reductionism, but it generally turns out that these doctrines are 
understood as methodological commitments rather than metaphysical doctrines.  As 
such—assume that phenomena of interest have causal explanations; look for 
underlying mechanisms—these commitments are surely unexceptionable.  On the 
other hand, the rise of systems biology in the last five years or so has brought a good 
deal of discussion of holism, emergence, and related ideas to the forefront of 
                                                 
9
 For this see Dupré 1993, part 3.   
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theoretical biological thought (Boogerd et al. 2007; O’Malley and Dupré 2007).  
Picking up on an idea promoted long ago by Donald Campbell (1974), biologists and 
philosophers have even started to consider seriously the idea of downward causation, 
the causation of the behaviour of parts by the whole. 
But here I don’t propose to review the arguments for or against these positions, but 
want only to consider whether the rejection of determinism and physicalist 
reductionism, together with the acceptance of emergent properties or downward 
causation would make any significant difference to the way we should think about the 
nature of the human.  In particular, can these ideas begin to make sense of human 
autonomy, or freedom of the will?  I want to argue against the still orthodox 
assumption that such issues are irrelevant to the issue of free will
10
. 
The reason why these issues are generally thought to have little relevance to the 
question of free will is straightforward.  It is naturally supposed that the alternative to 
determinism is indeterminism, lack of causality, or randomness.  But the concerns that 
people have about determinism, that it may seem to imply lack of control over or 
responsibility for, one’s actions, are hardly ameliorated by the thought that they are 
randomly generated.  As philosophers since Hume have observed, it is a rather more 
attractive thought that they are caused by one’s beliefs and desires.   
That propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires explain actions is largely 
uncontroversial, and most philosophers now hold that they do this because they cause 
actions.  But what does this mean?  One common picture is that beliefs and desires are 
states of the brain, and that these initiate signals down nerves which, in turn, cause the 
motions of parts of the body that constitute actions.  But this, of course, is a picture 
that fits naturally with the philosophical vision of microscopic causal transactions to 
which the apparent actions of macroscopic agents are mere epiphenomena.  A quite 
different picture begins with the rejection of the assimilation of beliefs, desires, and so 
on, to states of the brain.  This rejection is often motivated nowadays by externalism, 
the view that a belief, for example, depends for its identity on things in the world 
beyond its human possessor.  The alternative position, however motivated, is that 
believing that p, say, is a property of a whole human, and that the reification of a 
belief required in locating it in the brain is wholly unwarranted.  If a belief, or an 
                                                 
10
 Such an argument was presented in greater deal in Dupré, 2001, ch. 7. 
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instance of believing, is indeed a property of a whole human, then its causing of the 
movement of a part may be seen as a case of downward causation, the influence of the 
whole on one of is parts.  If this seems metaphysically extravagant, note that the 
familiar philosophical example ‘I raise my arm’, unless the I is a Cartesian ego or its 
current neurophysiological analogue, is an example of a whole (‘I’) acting on a part 
(‘my arm’).  So the rehabilitation of downward causation is an important step in 
beginning to make sense of the human agent as something causally efficacious, 
capable of making things happen, rather than merely an epiphenomenon of constituent 
microscopic happenings. 
This will all continue to seem to most philosophers metaphysically extravagant in 
comparison to the alternative story at the microphysiological level in which a complex 
array of physical particles in my brain acts on another such array in my arm.  If a 
belief is more than an array of stuff in my brain, then it may still only be that part of 
the belief that does the actual neurophysiological causing. Again, the description of all 
this in terms of whole person agency may seem epiphenomenal.   
But why does this alternative picture looks so much more philosophically plausible (if 
it does)?  The answer, I think, is that many of us are still captivated by a neo-
Laplacean picture in which everything really happens at the microphysical level, 
which is causally closed and complete.  And this picture cannot escape the implication 
that everything above the microphysical level is merely epiphenomenal.  If the parts 
of a thing have their behaviour determined by microphysics then so must the 
behaviour of the composite thing be determined.  Any appearance that it has casual 
powers of its own is illusory.  It is no more nor less necessary to appeal for causal 
explanation to the properties of my mental states than it is to the liquidity of water or 
the motion of tectonic plates.  To a LaPlacean calculator both are just the upshots of 
countless microscopic movements. 
The resolution of this problem, in my view, lies with abandoning the assumption of 
the causal completeness of the physical.  Although I cannot offer detailed arguments 
here against this assumption, I shall try to give some sense of why I think it can safely 
be abandoned.  The microphysical determination of everyday events is, at least, 
hardly something open to casual inspection.  It is, on the contrary, a metaphysical 
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assumption, and once open to serious consideration it is, it seems to me, a highly 
implausible one. 
Abandoning the assumption of causal completeness is giving up the idea of the 
universal reign of law, the assumption that everything happens in accordance with 
some universal causal regularity. Speculatively, I suggest that this is an idea grounded 
in the prescientific conception of law as the edict of a supreme lawgiver.  Certainly 
God should be capable of regulating every event, however minute; whether Nature 
could or should be expected to accomplish the same feat is another matter. Reflection 
on biology, on the other hand, should make such universal regularity quite 
implausible.  Not only are life processes constantly beset by at least the appearance of 
irregularity and unpredictability but, more significantly, regularity is won with great 
difficulty and ingenuity. The mechanisms that make possible the regularities that 
constitute the persistence of living things are more astonishing the better we come to 
understand them. 
Of course, this will seem entirely beside the point to someone convinced that 
universal law reigns at the microphysical level.  My point so far, however, is not to 
show that biology refutes microphysical determinism, but that it is incumbent on the 
determinist to offer an account of the relation between physical and biological 
phenomena.  This account will be reductionist, but not in the sense of explaining 
biological laws, since in the determinist’s sense there are none, but in the sense of 
explaining in principle every specific biological event.  Irregularity is then an 
expected consequence of the microphysical heterogeneity of biological entities and 
processes.  But then it appears that the determinist has explained too much; for 
biological regularities, the regularities that make possible the persistence of biological 
processes, while far from universal, are highly impressive and certainly in need of 
explanation. 
I will not attempt to show that the determinist can’t meet this challenge, but rather 
suggest that this is a point in the dialectic at which an entirely different perspective 
begins to look much more attractive.  This is the idea that causal regularity is in fact a 
rare and precious thing, bought at great cost in energy or ingenuity.  Biology, from 
this point of view, is not so much about tracing out how the causal regularities at the 
microphysical lead deductively to the (partial) regularities at the biological level, but 
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rather is a matter of seeing how the causal properties of physical entities are employed 
to constrain events and maintain the persistence of complex systems.  New properties, 
put to such purposes, are constantly emerging as more complex entities come into 
being.  The complex macromolecules employed by living systems have properties—
catalysing other reactions, forming structures with strength, elasticity, etc., 
neutralising alien biological entities, and so on—that are a result of their particular 
complex structures.  The combination of these new causal capacities in turn create 
systems with entirely new (emergent) capacities—the abilities to fix atmospheric 
nitrogen, say, or run down and consume prey—capacities that contribute to the 
persistence of the highly complex systems of which they are part. 
In this light, now consider the human developmental system, surely the most complex 
system in our experience.  This deploys the causal capacities of humans and the 
countless artefacts they create, and perpetuates the survival of the human lineage and 
the structures that serve that survival.  Central to this system is the human mind, an 
abstraction that I take to refer to the densest concentration of causal capacities in our 
experience, the capacities exercised in human intelligence, and without which it 
would be inconceivable that the human developmental niche could be maintained and 
indeed give rise to ever larger numbers of humans, in turn creating a set of problems 
that human intelligence may or may not ultimately succeed in solving. 
This then, to summarise, is the major step towards an understanding of human 
autonomy made possible by the rejection of determinism, and indeed leads to a far 
more satisfactory metaphysics of human nature.  Causal order is not something found 
saturating every part of the universe.  On the contrary it is something quite rare and 
specific in its locations.  It is found in the simplicity of massive physical processes 
such as are studied by astronomers; it is created with great difficulty in the complex, 
elaborately controlled and isolated machines built by physical scientists; and most 
spectacularly, though very differently in form, it is found in living beings.   
If there is a scale of nature, it is an increase in the causal powers, the construction of 
causal order and regularity.  One respect in which the human mind constitutes a 
further step in this scale is because it involves a new level of capacity to transform the 
world beyond the organism.  Humans, in my view, are the densest concentrations of 
causal capacities, or causal power, in our experience.  The niches we have constructed 
 22 
for ourselves—warm and sheltered housing, landscapes dominated by edible plants 
and docile and tasty animals, roads and machinery for moving ourselves about, and so 
on—are remarkable testimony to our causal potency.  But still, it may be asked, does 
this amount to real autonomy? 
How much autonomy do we want?  As I have already mentioned, we don’t want to 
conceptualise ourselves as random action generators.  And we do want our actions to 
be properly related to our mental states, our beliefs and desires.  Is there any sense 
that we can be said to choose our beliefs and desires?  Or if we cannot be said to 
choose them, can we at least in some sense own them? It seems to me that we can do 
so to the extent that we organise our lives in pursuit of consistent goals or principles.  
If I simply act in pursuit of whatever passing whim is uppermost at the moment I 
exhibit no more causal power than any other animal.  If I choose to build a bridge, 
write a book, or cook dinner, and subordinate my choice of actions to this decision, I 
exercise to a greater or lesser degree a distinctively human ability to shape the 
world
11
.  In the social realm, the ability to conform to principle, above all moral 
principle, is the kind of regimentation of behaviour that constitutes a uniquely human 
achievement.  And in the terms I have just been employing, it is through such plans or 
principles that human minds are able to impose regularity on the world. Clearly some 
acknowledgement of Kant is in order here, though the view I am proposing is a lot 
less arduous in its account of the kind of principle that might constitute freedom.  
Rather than one rationally grounded canon of morality that constitutes an action as 
free or unfree, I would rather suggest a spectrum of degrees of causal efficacy, 
ranging from the person described by Harry Frankfurt (1988) as the wanton, to those 
most efficacious in affecting the world through the subordination of their immediate 
desire to goals and principles
12
. 
                                                 
11
 I take it that this has a lot to do with the importance that many thinkers, perhaps most famously 
Marx, have attached to the autonomy exhibited in labour.  John Ruskin’s view of the Gothic cathedral 
is a powerful if romantic expression of the point. 
12
 I have described my view in the past as opposed to compatibilist views of free will.  Just before 
sending this paper to press I head John Perry’s Dewey Lecture at the 2010 American Philosophical 
Association Pacific Division meeting, which convinced me that this opposition was mistaken, provided 
compatibilism was understood as compatibility not with determinism, but merely with naturalistic 
causality.  Indeed, rereading the present paragraph, and reducing these slightly portentous plans and 
principles to the beliefs and desires that represent them on particular occasions of action, I suspect it 
promotes a form of compatibilism quite consistent with that which Perry persuasively articulates. 
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There are of course many big questions unanswered.  Can we choose what kind of 
person we will be, and if so when and how?  Is it better to be causally efficacious than 
merely content (Socrates or a satisfied pig)?  And no doubt many more.  My point is 
only that inverting the familiar question about human freedom, might humans be an 
exception to the otherwise universal rule of law to the almost diametrically opposite 
question, might humans be an extreme exception to an otherwise largely disordered 
and unruly universe, opens up a quite different, and perhaps more productive, set of 
questions. 
Conclusion 
This essay has had more to say about what human nature is not than what it is.  But 
this is no accident.  Ultimately my central contention is that human nature is open.  
Humans have powers to shape the world and themselves which, while no doubt not 
without limits, have surely not yet encountered those limits.  Hence I started this essay 
with my opposition to an influential perspective that not only insists on the 
importance of human nature, but offers us a methodology for determining exactly 
what it is.  Unfortunately this methodology is grounded in an obsolete and simple-
minded view of evolution.  Or perhaps I should say, “fortunately”.  For it seems to me 
that the narrow view of human nature presented by Evolutionary Psychology is not 
only mistaken, but is also potentially bad for us.  A limited view of human possibility 
must inevitably narrow human aspirations.  And though it should perhaps also be said 
that aspirations can be bad as well as good, so that the openness of human possibility, 
of possible changes to the human developmental niche, can cut both ways, I am 
sufficient of an optimist to feel that opening up a better future is worth the risk of 
making possible one that is worse. 
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